By: COLIN REESE
As many pundits, writers, commentators, and ex-players have pointed out, the quality of the soccer played by the United States and the success of the United States in the World Cup hasn’t improved from either the 2002 or the 2010 World Cups.
Certainly, the United States now has better soccer players and more of them, but the roster and the line-ups that Jürgen Klinsmann used in the 2014 World Cup did not reflect these improvements with the exception of DeAndre Yedlin.
While Jermaine Jones, Fabian Johnson, John Brooks, and Julian Green all played well in the 2014 World Cup, these players are a product of German soccer.
Some of the players from the 30-man preliminary roster such as Joe Corona, Terrence Boyd, and Maurice Edu that Klinsmann cut from the final 23-man USA World Cup roster could have added to the improvement in the overall skill of the team that players like Yedlin and Brooks brought to the squad.
Klinsmann did select the central attacking midfielder Mix Diskerud, but he didn’t use him at all in the World Cup. And, this one specific example showcases the coach of the United States’ inability to make adjustments to his tactics of deploying three defensive midfielders and two wings behind Clint Dempsey as the lone striker once Jozy Altidore injured his hamstring in the first match against Ghana.
The USA could have made the best of an unfortunate injury by using Diskerud as a central attacking midfielder to help the United States to improve its passing and improve the link-up play between the defensive midfielders and Dempsey.
Fabian Johnson, DaMarcus Beasley, and DeAndre Yedlin were already providing attacking width to the USA in their roles as outside backs, so starting Alejandro Bedoya and Graham Zusi was not as important as starting Diskerud.
The use of Diskerud was the one change that Klinsmann had available to him to improve the USA’s biggest weaknesses: possession and attacking strength.
Going forward, there are several things that Klinsmann and the USA need to do to improve the quality and effectiveness of the United States Men’s National Team and close the gap with better national teams.
1. Call Up and Field More Attacking Midfielders with Real Quality
Kyle Beckerman, Jermaine Jones, and Michael Bradley comprised the center of the American midfield, and all three of these players are defensive midfielders.
While Bradley and Jones are also box-to-box midfielders, they fall under the umbrella category of defensive midfielders compared to players like Clint Dempsey, Landon Donovan, Benny Feilhaber, Mix Diskerud, and Joe Corona who are attacking midfielders.
At the very least, a line of three attacking midfielders made up of Donovan, Dempsey, and Corona wasn’t too much to expect from Klinsmann, and all three were on the preliminary 30-man roster.
Klinsmann can’t make the same mistake of passing over too many of these attacking midfielders in the future.
Instead of just including Dempsey and Diskerud only to never even play Diskerud, the United States could have used Clint Dempsey, Landon Donovan, Benny Feilhaber, Joe Corona, and Mix Diskerud all on the World Cup roster.
Luckily, the USA also has young, talented, and complete midfielders such as Benji Joya and Dillon Powers ready to play international soccer right now, and these two players are great two-way central attacking midfielders that also excel as box-to-box midfielders. Joya is also effective and dangerous on either wing.
Starting Beckerman/Cameron, Jones, and Bradley in the World Cup made sense for Klinsmann if he wanted to protect the center of the park and of the defense, but the moment that he was using Bradley as a central attacking midfielder and Jones as another attacking midfielder he was hurting the the USA’s ability to pass and attack.
Either Bradley or Jones needed to play the role of the stay-at-home defensive midfielder. Adding another defensive midfielder was playing too defensively, and it was also playing too small to speak metaphorically. Klinsmann needed to give either Bradley or Jones strict orders to play the role of the stay-at-home defensive midfielder.
The USA needs three or four defensive midfielders on the roster along with four or five more attack-minded midfielders on the roster. Nine midfielders comprised of defensive midfielders, box-to-box midfielders, and attacking midfielders (either wings or playmakers or both) is the way to go, and this leaves roster space for three out-and-out strikers or Number 9s.
2. Call Up Two to Three Quality Number 9s
Jozy Altidore, Aron Jóhannsson, Juan Agudelo, and Terrence Boyd would have been great selections to the World Cup roster, but there was no excuse for Chris Wondolowski being selected as a striker.
The United States cannot continue to have no back-up target striker and not enough attacking midfield options off the bench.
3. Use More of America’s Talented Young Players Like DeAndre Yedlin
DeAndre Yedlin was mocked by many professional pundits and writers for being inexperienced and too young, but once he took the field in the World Cup this turned out to be totally wrong. Klinsmann promised more proactive and better soccer, and he didn’t keep his promise when he cut Joe Corona from the 30-man roster. Corona is older and more experienced than Yedlin, and if Yedlin was deemed ready then Corona should have been deemed ready as well, especially since he was a proven attacking midfielder that could play wide or centrally.
Shane O’Neill, Chris Klute, Benji Joya, Joe Corona, Andrew Farrell, and Juan Agudelo are all young American players that are ready to play now, and Klinsmann owes them a fair shot. Since Yedlin impressed at the World Cup, then it’s time to showcase the improvement in the overall quality of American players such as O’Neill, Klute, Corona, Joya, Farrell, and Agudelo.
Since the 2006 World Cup only Dempsey, Donovan, Bradley, and Feilhaber have really shown a consistent ability to showcase noteworthy technical skill against top national teams, and young players like Corona, Joya, and Agudelo in particular are definitely ready to give the USMNT additional technical players that can improve the collective skill level of the national team.
4. Start Balanced Line-Ups
Starting Tim Howard, DeAndre Yedlin, Geoff Cameron, Matt Besler/John Brooks, Fabian Johnson, Jermaine Jones, Michael Bradley, Landon Donovan, Joe Corona, Clint Dempsey, and Jozy Altidore would have made sense before the World Cup, and starting this XI would not have been risky nor would it have required much soccer acumen.
Klinsmann has been overcomplicating his line-ups. He likes the 4-2-3-1, so he should start four defenders, two defensive midfielders, three attacking midfielders, and one striker.
Using the 4-2-3-1 correctly requires better scouting of players and using the best players at their natural positions, and the other consideration that needs to be taken into account is making sure that the 10 field players play well together; merely using the very best player at each position might not yield the best collective performance.
Going forward, starting Howard, Yedlin, Cameron, Brooks, Klute, Edu, Bradley, Corona, Feilhaber, Dempsey, and Agudelo seems like a good Starting XI to try out, and at least this line-up uses two two-way outside backs, two complete center backs, a defensive and box-to-box midfielder, two technical and dynamic wings, a creative playmaker, and a complete striker.
This sort of balance between defensive-minded and attack-minded midfielders to improve the possession and passing of the USA is certainly better than starting the types of unbalanced or overly-defensive Front Sixes used in the World Cup, which were devoid of any link-up play.
Since he coaches a country of 315 million people, Klinsmann should be expected to field a line-up that is balanced, talented, and capable of scoring and keeping a decent amount of possession against top national teams. The United States certainly has the players to do that.